Distinguish them. Amongst the uneasy is first the want of impressions, the want of new impressions, the sense of dulness, torpor and languor, of interrupted thinking, confusion of ideas, the sense of interrupted circulations of intermixed digestion, evacuation of ungratified appetites. I have subdivided the agreeable into the agreeable and pleasant, the disagreeable into the uneasy disagreeable and disagreeable, to the first of which I can give no relation. Yet the pleasure of motion as that of walking, of riding in a machine, of flying, which we have not thought of, and that which I have liked because it approached to flying, may be considered as corresponding to uneasiness. There is a pleasure from facility, clarity, and vigour in bodily exercise, and lastly in the gratification of pleasure in appetite, which last may be approached to pleasure, yet we distinguish between the indulging in these, and the pleasure we receive. Now all these may be considered as corresponding to what I call uneasiness. This application will certainly come afterwards. Now I wish to consider the degree of both the
The side of the agreeable is first sensation; next sensation to be considered is dephthoscope; next perception of relation that amounts to the perception of truth and in a great measure that of ability; and the perception of truth will run very high of our own invention; next sensation then bodily exercise with facility, alacrity, and vigour. The pleasure of strong drink, of a mid Pastime, the effects of it may be to give facility, alacrity and vigour in acting and thinking; therefore it belongs to the head of easy thinking or of easy motion. In the more specific sensations depending upon particular organs, we put as at the lowest, perception of beauty abstracting from motion, & the sense of the beauty of the eye. Next to figure and colour are the perceptions of melody and harmony, which too, are to be abstracted from motion; next is taste without appetite. Thus in a higher degree of corporeal pleasure that of fragrant flowers. Next comes the sense of titillation without appetite. Next pleasure in the sensation from fatigue; next indulging our propensity. Our yielding to stress and fainting. But there is behemoth, a propensity various and not to be limited here. First titillation with appetite, next the pleasure of labour connected with its expiation, gratification of appetite, and last of all, the gratification of passions. The gratification of some appetites may be in a higher degree than that of some passions. It depends upon the greater or lesser degree of sensibility.

A state of disagreeable sensations.

First is want of impressions, next is want of non-implessions, next want of accidental impressions. Often habit introduces artificial appetites, the want of which is often attended with every high degree of uneasiness. Next the expansions of pleasures in their nature not satisfied, as in the case of taste and smell; next is soon satisfied, that of the ear which are much longer, & of the sight with no sense at all satiable. Next the sensation of intermixture are able. Next the sensation of intermixture are able. Next follows sense of intermixture are able. Next occurs a sensation of deformity, including it is not an object of fear. Next hardness.
It is necessary to mark out as many kinds of company, I have avoided the use of the second term, as the disgnizable I should belong to, & the others, the ease to the state of our own mood, the ruin, full to the

In the other side between the

agreeable & pleasant I can only find different

degree. I think I attempted to distinguish the degree of the different kinds. It is but an approach towards an idea; it naturally came to some arrangement, in the different degrees I said it might be useful on various occasions. I would wish to inquire when what corporal state an idea of the different degrees of pleasure & pain. I said that with regard to these they were in a sort of compound ratio of the degree of impulse & sensibility taken together. It is more doubtful whether that applies to the different kinds. The idea of kind as well as species depends upon age, temperament &c. pleasure or pain very often depend upon a measure of compulsion, as evident in the affairs of nature. Something of the effect of sensation seems to constitute the whole of sensation and there is something like this in taste & smell. Sounds

218 of discor. With much in expecting an unsa-

ry passion is ever to be considered as disgnizable

may be a question. But I deny it; because when the

pleasure of commiseration we willingly indulge

them, therefore I mention several discords.

Not a general sense of disgusting feeling taking place

as more strong than the sensation of deformity

or discords. So when I touch a woollen cloth, & when I touch velvet or flannel, it throws me almost into a convulsion. Next nauseous taste and felt odor, as in very different degree, it may be in full which should be felt first. Next there is lastdacle, of a higher degree in what we call sick-nis; and still higher is anxiety. Next is the restraint of propensity; then that of appetite, and lastly bodily pain.

With regard to these three last, your opinion will determine you to estimate them very variously; and your estimate upon the whole may be disturbed. Nor will I answer that it is right; different constitutions & dispositions may vary the matter. But still don't hesitate to accuracy that we do not exactly come up to it is useful.
we can yet explain without a particular feeling in
our sensations. But yet the effect is often retailed
by decaying or good warning. But it proceeds seem-
ingly against our determination, and therefore is
called involuntary. But I believe we are asiled
between contrary motions, of which the
prevails. However I have no involuntary motions but
where we are not conscious of the impression or motion
following. Inclination therefore is still almost the
right. I would willingly yield to the action of
another principle, because we know that by ha-
bout any motion may be entirely restrained. The we
have a general propensity to yield to motions in
case of necessity yet we don't know what sort
of motion can follow, nor to repeat the same
motion by any effort of our will unless the origi-

nal sensation is removed. We make a number
of random motions because we are acquainted
with their effects, such as the motion of yawning,
neck, stretching, sitting, sitting, coughing, sudden
or slow; they can be in a certain degree restrained
by a contrary motion; a man when he would
cough may be hindered by a pain in his side, and
like instances will apply to the rest. When all

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...external impressions that prove incentives to them, and that will affect them differently, now when a man is satisfied he is difficultly excided to show or swallow by the desire even of the most irreverent or the pleasure of taste. But when he is insufficiently satisfied it is certain that these external incentives will renew the desire. Every body knows how long the moral will be cured in the mouth before it can be thrown over the fences, and, since continence is given of this by ambition, a man with another in the throat refused food because he had not time & had it not in his power to swallow, but an apette arising spontaneously he could swallow easily and swallow a much more morre without the pain which he had felt before on the lighter trial. In general with regard to all our apetites of hunger in this respect is the most natural. We can the least command the motion of appetites as the taking of drink is adapted to a greater variety of purposes so we have it even in our power, and last of all are we restrained in the apetite of drink. Now having showed how far the motion of apetite are in the power of the will, let me observe that even the propagation
call that reason. And it is reason too when there is room for a choice of means. Instinct and reason, to me only differ as the shades of the same colour. If you chose only to call that voluntary where there is an end and purpose, you must still allow that those are determined by passion and the will accompanying, and in whatever the propensity is the same. Volition does not always determine the external action, thence produced by a solution to the effect. I incline my body to throw a stone and am very little attentive to the mode of action by which I throw it. The actions are purely the effect of imagination without our being attentive to them. It is nearly the external action of the body, that is will; we are not conscious of the internal motions of the body. I shall state this more fully afterwards. Under repulsion of action the external body becomes much more subject to it, but it is not from conscious necessity, it is without mechanism. In any one action there is some manner the concurrence of a particular application that I have not time for just now. I am next to consider volition with reference to those laws as much as to the mechanism of the body.
by necessary to every sentient part. We now return to explain upon what parts more especially so impressive and acute sensation. It has been thought that the soul immediately lays up the motion in the extremity; others are of opinion that that motion is communicated from the extremity to the origin. This question affects our system very materially in another place, and has been agitated for a thousand years. The supposition of the soul is very agreeable to the human heart, but it has on many occasions suffered, interrupted, &c. Besides our theory, I am cautious of admitting it because I do not know its operations, and I am for admitting mechanism anywhere will you? I think then that the motions are communicated and propagated to the brain. I say then that there is a continuity of substance and that very uniform and that is enough for the possibility. But that continuity of substance is equally sensible in every part of its course. Indeed the strictest Italian will not refuse that a motion
in interrupting all sensation and comprehension. The sensation may, though the communication to lesser parts may be by other purposes than a communication of motions; and they say that ligatures do not destroy communication from the extremity to the origin, but by preventing some thing coming to it from the origin. This opinion that opinion is most simple and highly probable supported by other arguments. Nay we are often sensible of it as in the aura of epilepsy. Now that attend sensations, as in delirious animi. We perceive as if a somewhat moved along our indument we trace it till it comes near the head, and is arriving at the origin all sense is destroyed and only very irregular motions produced. A motion also arises along the intestines to the stomach and then to the lungs and last of all all sensations. Now it is not enough that we perceive that but we know that a light ligature knows its further progress towards the origin. This has at all times been admitted as a proof of what I have advanced. Another argument...
280 is the singular phenomenon of a frequent occasion which a man refers to a former sense, of foot or head, as if it were still there; now these feelings when that that had of it is not touched, is in proof that the impression is truly made there, and proves that the impressions are made upon one place and the sensations on another. So many reasons are given for perceptsions arising only in the common origin and the sensation being in the extremity of the nerve.

SOMNIA CUMMCUNAE

It is strictly manifest that all our perceptions are strictly perceived in the senorium. It is first that the whole of memory, the simplest act of reminiscence, depends upon the origin of the nerves. Innumerable histories shows that memory is unimpaired or destroyed by various marked affections of the brain. Another are these that prove that the diminishing of the memory depends upon the affections of the brain only. The liver may be changed and yet the memory remain perfectly intact. But on the other hand almost always when the memory is destroyed we can presume a particular change in the structure of the brain. By the brain, I shall always mean the common origin of the nerves. All the proofs have gone so far that many have supposed a particular mechanism in the brain, as B. Bouch - below in France, & B. Ronniy have all argued to explain it. But they have not done it so as to subsist in a certain principle. I will select two proofs; the first is that our sensations or darts may be removed by impressions made elsewhere. The brain, independent of the external organs from which they are commonly derived, and that these sensations are in the same condition as formerly they had been perceived by impressions on the nerves. With regard to them, to become in delirium when there have been corresponding external impressions made, it is not easy to suppose that they happen from motion directly excited in the brain. In many instances we can find the change of external conformation, and a fuller impulse of the blood may be excited as in delirium and dreams.
I observe that they are only renewals of impressions that at first had arisen in the usual way. Dreams have most unusually a connection with the actions of the preceding day as is illustrated in Horace's and Shakspeare's fairy plays. Now complex Ideas are formed as in imagination, but what ever novelty attends them they are always such as have been received from various external impressions. Now it gives the strongest presumption that there is a mechanism so that those are in the stomach. There Ideas are renewed by internal causes, but only they are renewed by impressions upon the organs of sense or the common origin of the eye. This question does not answer. If there be a mechanism it is owing to a mechanism in the common origin of the senses. It has when degenerated all his former Ideas received by the eye, and is called renew them. And so a blind man cannot contain the Ideas of colour. And nothing can take place there but a decay of memory, for want of repetition. When we touch a body with a stick, we may as well suppose the power of the soul in the extremity of the stick as in extreme parts of the body; and we must extend the mechanism as far as possible.

LECT. LIII. Sept. 2.

We must now come to amend in our chain of cause and effect. Newton's letter was supposed to be the last cause and the energy of the blaze. But if I should ask that still further, there is no doubt to hurt religion. We are in no danger of thrusting a duty out of the universe, nor a soul out of the existence of doing. The memory I said before was not only fundamental, but carried on the whole train of the operations of the mind. Some then to be connected with a certain fabrication of the brain; and worked affections of it into pair or destroy the intellectual faculties. When the destruction of the medulla spinalis seems to affect our mental operations, as it does a variance in some operations and a sense of motions in others, and when it is affected, the constant mental continues still entire.